

DELAYING World War II

The Munich Agreement



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Video Page



Teacher's Guide

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Delaying WWII

Suggested Lesson Plan

These materials may be used in a variety of ways. For maximum benefit, we suggest the following lesson plan:

- As a class, discuss the Preview Questions and Key Terms.
- Distribute copies of the Viewing Guide for students to use as a note-taking tool during the video.
- Play the video, pausing if needed to facilitate understanding and note-taking.
- Review and discuss answers to the Viewing Guide using Answer Key as a guide.
- Use Discussion Questions to spark class discussion, or assign these questions as homework.
- As a class or in small groups, complete the Who Chooses Activity.
- Replay the video as preparation for the Quiz.
- Administer and grade the Quiz using Answer Key as a guide.
- Optional: Assign one or more Enrichment Activities as homework.

Delaying WWII

Preview Questions

(These are meant to be read aloud by the teacher.)

1. Locate Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and Germany on a map.
2. How did the end of World War I influence the events in Germany and Czechoslovakia?
3. What are appeasement and deterrence?
4. How might appeasement and deterrence influence another country's actions?

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Key Terms and Definitions

Aggression – a behavior or action toward another that is hostile, intimidating, and/or violent

Annexation – the seizure of another country's land, typically by force

Anschluss – the annexation of Austria by Germany on March 12, 1938 to form a greater unified Germany

Appeasement - to make or preserve peace with a nation, group, or person by giving in to their demands

Bunker – a fortification typically built partially or completely underground and designed for protection and defense

Concession – the act of giving something of value – such as land, money or material to an adversary – in order to avoid conflict

Destabilize – the act of undermining or making something, such as a country, less stable

Fortification – a system of buildings, bunkers, and or other structures designed to defend territory

Magnanimity – generous or unselfish behavior, sometimes displayed toward one's enemy

Nazi – a member of the National Socialist German Workers' Party headed by Adolf Hitler which assumed political and governmental control of Germany from 1933 to 1945.

Ossification – the process of becoming rigidly fixed in a pattern of thought or behavior

Sovereign nation – an independent nation (free from outside influence) with control over its internal affairs and within its geographic boundaries

Sudetenland – the German name for the Bohemian and Moravian areas of former Czechoslovakia that were mostly inhabited by ethnic Germans

Versailles Treaty – a peace treaty between Germany and the Allied powers, signed on June 28, 1919, that officially ended World War I

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Name: _____

Date: _____

Delaying WWII **Viewing Guide**

1. In the late 1930s, _____ began to make increasingly aggressive territorial demands.
2. Near the German border, _____ built a system of fortifications which might have prevented World War II.
3. Czechoslovakia had a very large German minority in what was called the _____.
4. _____ had a mutual military assistance treaty with Czechoslovakia, but they did not want to face Germany without British help.
5. _____, believing that Hitler's territorial claims would end when the Sudetenland was handed over to Germany, decided to appease him.
6. The problem with _____ is that until the human condition changes, it's usually considered by aggressors as a sign of weakness to be exploited, rather than reciprocity to be appreciated.
7. The _____ people celebrated in the streets because it meant that there wasn't going to be a war.
8. _____ had less material resources in the mid-1930s than the combined democracies on the European continent.
9. _____, who would later become prime minister during World War II, warned that Germany would occupy the whole of Czechoslovakia and worse would happen.
10. Winston Churchill suggested countries should only _____ using appeasement from a position of strength.

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Viewing Guide Answer Key

1. Nazi Germany
2. Czechoslovakia
3. Sudetenland
4. France
5. Chamberlain
6. Appeasement
7. British
8. Hitler
9. Winston Churchill
10. negotiate

Discussion Questions

1. How was Czechoslovakia originally formed?
2. What is the origin of the Nazis' claim to parts of Czechoslovakia?
3. The Versailles Treaty established boundaries for central European countries after World War I. How did this contribute to border disputes in the 1930s?
4. What territorial demand did Hitler seize prior to his demand for the Sudetenland?
5. Should the presence of ethnicities in other countries be a sufficient reason to cede territory to the country from which the peoples' ethnicity originates?
6. Who were Czechoslovakia's allies prior to and during the Sudetenland negotiations?
7. Since the Czechs prepared to fight the Nazis to legally retain its land, why were they not included in the agreement?
8. By what criteria should one favor peace over confrontation of a bully?
9. Why was the United States not directly involved in the agreement?
10. Appeasement came into currency in the 1920s and '30s as a positive term. What was the logic of appeasement as a strategy at that time?
11. How did appeasement lead to desired outcomes?
12. In what way(s) can appeasement backfire?
13. In hindsight, the appeasement approach to Hitler is viewed by historians as a failure. Why?
14. Victor Hanson stated, "Hitler had less material resources in the mid-1930s than the combined democracies on the European continent." What is Hanson's point? What do you suppose might have happened had Britain and France not negotiated away the Sudetenland?
15. Why was Winston Churchill convinced appeasement would not work?
16. What is the significance of each change in borders from post-World War I through the end of the 20th century?
17. Why did Victor Hanson suggest that Hitler concluded the winners of World War I were more traumatized than the losers?

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Activity:

Who chooses? Who benefits? Who pays? What's fair?

The four questions above can be a useful tool for evaluating any policy or system. Posing the questions is a great way to stimulate critical thinking. As a class, or in small groups, discuss the following:

(For each question, think broadly about all the possible people or groups of people who may be affected, and remember there may be non-monetary costs and benefits.)

Who should have decided if appeasement should have been used and concessions given when negotiating with Germany regarding the Sudetenland?

Who benefitted from appeasement toward Germany, and who benefits when appeasement is used in other situations?

Who pays when appeasement is used? Is this fair to each party involved? Explain.

When appeasement is used to reduce the likelihood a country will act aggressively toward others, what options are given up? In other words, what opportunity costs are incurred? Is this fair to the citizens of countries that use appeasement as a foreign policy strategy? Is there an effective balance between appeasement and deterrence, and who should choose?

Name: _____

Date: _____

Delaying WWII **Quiz**

1. In the late 1930s, Nazi Germany began to make increasingly _____ territorial demands.
 - A) alarming
 - B) aggressive
 - C) accommodating
 - D) annoying

2. First, Austria was annexed, and then, in 1938 Hitler turned his eye to the border regions of Czechoslovakia known as _____.
 - A) the Anschluss
 - B) Bratislava
 - C) Trnava
 - D) the Sudetenland

3. Hitler tried to destabilize Czechoslovakia, a country he hated because it had been created by the _____.
 - A) United Nations
 - B) League of Nations
 - C) Paris Accord
 - D) Versailles Treaty

4. Czechoslovakia's most powerful allies at the time were the _____ and the _____.
 - A) United States; British
 - B) French; British
 - C) United States; French
 - D) Austrians; Hungarians

5. _____ was Great Britain's leader at the time of the Hitler's territorial claim on Czechoslovakia.
 - A) Neville Chamberlain
 - B) Franklin Roosevelt
 - C) Adolf Hitler
 - D) Édouard Daladier

6. Between 1936 and 1938, as German power grew, Czechoslovakia built over _____ heavy bunkers.
- A) 20
 - B) 200
 - C) 2,000
 - D) 20,000
7. _____ is a political strategy where one party makes concessions – like giving land or money or material to an adversary – in order to avoid conflict.
- A) Deterrence
 - B) Avoidance
 - C) Appeasement
 - D) Atonement
8. The Munich Agreement granted the Nazis' claims to Czech lands. The Czech people viewed this as a great betrayal, particularly since_____.
- A) they wanted to join with Hungary instead
 - B) they already had defenses set up on the border
 - C) they did not speak German
 - D) they weren't even invited to the negotiation table
9. _____ commented on the effectiveness of appeasement when he stated, "There was never any danger of a fight if all the time one side meant to give away completely."
- A) Winston Churchill
 - B) Neville Chamberlain
 - C) Adolf Hitler
 - D) Édouard Daladier
10. Within a year of the Munich Agreement, the Nazis occupied _____ of Czechoslovakia.
- A) one quarter
 - B) one half
 - C) three quarters
 - D) the whole

Delaying WWII **Quiz Answer Key**

Quiz

1. B. aggressive
2. D. the Sudetenland
3. D. Versailles Treaty
4. B. French; British
5. A. Neville Chamberlain
6. B. 200
7. C. Appeasement
8. D. they weren't even invited to the negotiation table
9. A. Winston Churchill
10. D. the whole

Delaying WWII

Enrichment and Integration Activities

Research Projects: Work independently or in small groups. Choose one or more of the topics below to learn more about. Gather information from multiple sources to help answer the questions. Create a report that includes both written and visual elements such as pictures, charts, maps, and/or graphs. Be sure to cite your sources. Share your findings with the class in a presentation.

A. History of appeasement. Besides Czechoslovakia, what are other historical instances in which countries used appeasement effectively? What are some historical instances where appeasement was used ineffectively?

B. Aggressive country. Germany is not the first country to be an aggressor. Identify two or more examples of aggressive countries throughout history. (Could be contemporary time period as well!) What actions led them to be labeled an aggressor? How did other countries address the actions? What were the consequences? How are these similar and different to the actions of Germany in the 1930s and 1940s?

C. Destabilization. This is a tactic sometimes used by a country to undermine an enemy's ability to defend itself, as was the case with Germany. What are some other examples of the use of this tactic throughout history? How about in the use of fictional literature? How are these similar and different to the actions of Germany in the 1930s and 1940s?

D. Writing Activities. A number of perspectives existed, at the time, regarding the outcome of the Munich Agreement. Navigate to the following links and select one or more of the historical newspapers:

The Glasgow Herald, September 29, 1938:

<https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=kEBAAAAIIBAJ&sjid=e1kMAAAAIBAJ&pg=6396%2C4429274>

The Gazette (Montreal, Canada), September 30, 1938:

<https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=p4kxAAAIBAJ&sjid=bqgFAAAAIBAJ&pg=6572%2C4061366>

The Pittsburgh Press (Pittsburgh, PA), September 30, 1938:

<https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=qEkqAAAIBAJ&sjid=N0wEAAAIBAJ&pg=3838%2C6405095>

The Daily News (U.S. Virgin Islands), September 30, 1938

<https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=nqFNAAAIBAJ&sjid=qUMDAAAIBAJ&pg=5699%2C2084908>

Next, locate an article from the last 10 years in which appeasement was used (hint: type appeasement into Google, then select News). Compare and contrast a current article with one or more of these.

E. Imagine you are a non-German citizen of the Sudetenland in October 1938. Write a letter to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain expressing your thoughts and feelings regarding how the allies treated the Sudetenland in giving it over to Germany to attempt to appease Hitler.

F. Research the history of Czechoslovakia from its formation in 1918 as a multiethnic state through 1938. Suggest how its actions may have contributed to the decision by France and Britain to cede to Germany the Sudetenland in 1938.

DELAYING WWII

Munich Agreement Primary Documents Lesson Plan

Name: _____

Date: _____

Instructor: _____

Time to complete:	60 minutes
Materials/ Technology/ Resources:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">* The <i>Delaying WWII</i> video (DVD format, or it can be streamed from izzit.org with no login required.)* Presentation Method (smartboard, projector, etc.)* Viewing Guide

Standards:	Use our free and easy-to-use Standard Alignment tool to align this lesson with the standards in your school district.
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Learning Objective(s):	<i>Students will examine primary source documents related to the Munich Agreement. They will summarize the main points and will discuss the implications of them.</i>
Topics: Czechoslovakia, Munich Agreement, Hitler, Chamberlain, Churchill, Daladier, Mussolini	

Absorb: (11:10 minutes)	<u>Watch:</u> <i>Delaying WWII</i> video in DVD format, or it can be streamed from izzit.org with no login required.
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Overall guiding question(s):	What are key documents that shaped the borders of Czechoslovakia in 1938?
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Lesson Procedures: (30 minutes)	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Watch video: <i>Delaying WWII</i>2. PROCEDURES:<ol style="list-style-type: none">a. ACTIVITY: Divide the class into groups and distribute the two documents (note: Churchill's
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	<p>speech is longer than the Munich Agreement).</p> <p>b. Students will use the organizers to note specific themes in the documents they are assigned.</p> <p>c. Assign each group at least one question related to their assigned document to discuss when groups are brought back together. Example questions may include: How effective has / have each document's contents been in achieving the stated objectives? If you could add anything to the document(s) to make them more effective, what would that be?</p>
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<p>Summary & Assessment: (15 minutes)</p>	<p>Assessment can be on content and or the discussion regarding the insight students gained while completing the organizer.</p> <p>Bring students back together to discuss their response(s) to the assigned question and any themes they noted. Encourage the students to discuss the significance of their assigned document(s) on Czechoslovakia and peace in Europe in the late 1930s.</p>
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<p>Reflection: (5 minutes)</p>	<p>Select a current event, either from izzit.org or a news site. Discuss how the items like these documents influence the use of appeasement as an international peace strategy.</p>
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The Munich Agreement

Name: _____ Date: _____

<p>Agreement concluded at Munich, September 29, 1938, between Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy</p> <p>September 29, 1938</p>	NOTES
<p>GERMANY, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement, which has been already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfilment:</p> <p>(1) The evacuation will begin on 1st October.</p> <p>(2) The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th October, without any existing installations having been destroyed, and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations.</p> <p>(3) The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.</p> <p>(4) The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on 1st October. The four territories marked on the attached map will be occupied by German troops in the following order:</p> <p>The territory marked No. I on the 1st and 2nd of October; the territory marked No. II on the 2nd and 3rd of October; the territory marked No. III on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of October; the territory marked No. IV on the 6th and 7th of October. The remaining</p>	

territory of preponderantly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.

(5) The international commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.

(6) The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission. The commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, in certain exceptional cases, minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite.

(7) There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer of population and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.

(8) The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.

Munich, September 29, 1938.
ADOLF HITLER,
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
EDOUARD DALADIER,
BENITO MUSSOLINI

Churchill's Response to the Munich Agreement

Name: _____ Date: _____

House of Commons Sitting of 5 October 1938 Winston Churchill's response to the Munich Agreement Before the House of Commons, as part of a speech regarding the policy of His Majesty's government October 5, 1938	NOTES
<p>5.10 p.m.</p> <p>Mr. Churchill:</p> <p>If I do not begin this afternoon by paying the usual, and indeed almost invariable, tributes to the Prime Minister for his handling of this crisis, it is certainly not from any lack of personal regard. We have always, over a great many years, had very pleasant relations, and I have deeply understood from personal experiences of my own in a similar crisis the stress and strain he has had to bear; but I am sure it is much better to say exactly what we think about public affairs, and this is certainly not the time when it is worth anyone's while to court political popularity. We had a shining example of firmness of character from the late First Lord of the Admiralty two days ago. He showed that firmness of character which is utterly unmoved by currents of opinion, however swift and violent they may be. My hon. Friend the Member for South-West Hull (Mr. Law), to whose compulsive speech the House listened on Monday—which I had not the good fortune to hear, but which I read, and which I am assured by all who heard it revived the memory of his famous father, so cherished in this House, and made us feel that his gifts did not die with him—was quite right in reminding us that the Prime Minister has himself throughout his conduct of these matters shown a robust indifference to cheers or boos and to the alternations of criticism and applause. If that be so, such qualities and elevation of mind should make it possible for the most severe expressions of honest opinion to be interchanged in this House without rupturing personal relations, and for all points of view to receive the fullest possible expression.</p>	

Having thus fortified myself by the example of others, I will proceed to emulate them. I will, therefore, begin by saying the most unpopular and most unwelcome thing. I will begin by saying what everybody would like to ignore or forget but which must nevertheless be stated, namely, that we have sustained a total and unmitigated defeat, and that France has suffered even more than we have.

Viscountess Astor: Nonsense.

Mr. Churchill:

When the Noble Lady cries "Nonsense," she could not have heard the Chancellor of the Exchequer admit in his illuminating and comprehensive speech just now that Herr Hitler had gained in this particular leap forward in substance all he set out to gain. The utmost my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has been able to secure by all his immense exertions, by all the great efforts and mobilisation which took place in this country, and by all the anguish and strain through which we have passed in this country, the utmost he has been able to gain—[HON. MEMBERS: "Is peace."] I thought I might be allowed to make that point in its due place, and I propose to deal with it. The utmost he has been able to gain for Czechoslovakia and in the matters which were in dispute has been that the German dictator, instead of snatching his victuals from the table, has been content to have them served to him course by course.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said it was the first time Herr Hitler had been made to retract—I think that was the word—in any degree. We really must not waste time, after all this long Debate, upon the difference between the positions reached at Berchtesgaden, at Godesberg and at Munich. They can be very simply epitomised, if the House will permit me to vary the metaphor. £1 was demanded at the pistol's point. When it was given, £2 were demanded at the pistol's point. Finally, the dictator consented to take £1 17s. 6d. and the rest in promises of good will for the future.

Now I come to the point, which was mentioned to me just now from some quarters of the House, about

the saving of peace. No one has been a more resolute and uncompromising struggler for peace than the Prime Minister. Everyone knows that. Never has there been such intense and undaunted determination to maintain and to secure peace. That is quite true. Nevertheless, I am not quite clear why there was so much danger of Great Britain or France being involved in a war with Germany at this juncture if, in fact, they were ready all along to sacrifice Czechoslovakia. The terms which the Prime Minister brought back with him—I quite agree at the last moment; everything had got off the rails and nothing but his intervention could have saved the peace, but I am talking of the events of the summer—could easily have been agreed, I believe, through the ordinary diplomatic channels at any time during the summer. And I will say this, that I believe the Czechs, left to themselves and told they were going to get no help from the Western Powers, would have been able to make better terms than they have got—they could hardly have worse—after all this tremendous perturbation.

There never can be any absolute certainty that there will be a fight if one side is determined that it will give way completely. When one reads the Munich terms, when one sees what is happening in Czechoslovakia from hour to hour, when one is sure, I will not say of Parliamentary approval but of Parliamentary acquiescence, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer makes a speech which at any rate tries to put in a very powerful and persuasive manner the fact that, after all, it was inevitable and indeed righteous—right—when we saw all this, and everyone on this side of the House, including many Members of the Conservative Party who are supposed to be vigilant and careful guardians of the national interest, it is quite clear that nothing vitally affecting us was at stake, it seems to me that one must ask, What was all the trouble and fuss about?

The resolve was taken by the British and the French Governments. Let me say that it is very important to realise that it is by no means a question which the British Government only have had to decide. I very much admire the manner in which, in

the House, all references of a recriminatory nature have been repressed, but it must be realised that this resolve did not emanate particularly from one or other of the Governments but was a resolve for which both must share in common the responsibility. When this resolve was taken and the course was followed—you may say it was wise or unwise, prudent or short-sighted—once it had been decided not to make the defence of Czechoslovakia a matter of war, then there was really no reason, if the matter had been handled during the summer in the ordinary way, to call into being all this formidable apparatus of crisis. I think that point should be considered.

We are asked to vote for this Motion which has been put upon the Paper, and it is certainly a Motion couched in very uncontroversial terms, as, indeed, is the Amendment moved from the Opposition side. I cannot myself express my agreement with the steps which have been taken, and as the Chancellor of the Exchequer has put his side of the case with so much ability I will attempt, if I may be permitted, to put the case from a different angle. I have always held the view that the maintenance of peace depends upon the accumulation of deterrents against the aggressor, coupled with a sincere effort to redress grievances. Herr Hitler's victory, like so many of the famous struggles that have governed the fate of the world, was won upon the narrowest of margins. After the seizure of Austria in March we faced this problem in our Debates. I ventured to appeal to the Government to go a little further than the Prime Minister went, and to give a pledge that in conjunction with France and other Powers they would guarantee the security of Czechoslovakia while the Sudeten-Deutsch question was being examined either by a League of Nations Commission or some other impartial body, and I still believe that if that course had been followed events would not have fallen into this disastrous state. I agree very much with my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) when he said on that occasion—I cannot remember his actual words—"Do one thing or the other; either say you will disinterest yourself in the matter altogether or

take the step of giving a guarantee which will have the greatest chance of securing protection for that country."

France and Great Britain together, especially if they had maintained a close contact with Russia, which certainly was not done, would have been able in those days in the summer, when they had the prestige, to influence many of the smaller States of Europe, and I believe they could have determined the attitude of Poland. Such a combination, prepared at a time when the German dictator was not deeply and irrevocably committed to his new adventure, would, I believe, have given strength to all those forces in Germany which resisted this departure, this new design. They were varying forces, those of a military character which declared that Germany was not ready to undertake a world war, and all that mass of moderate opinion and popular opinion which dreaded war, and some elements of which still have some influence upon the German Government. Such action would have given strength to all that intense desire for peace which the helpless German masses share with their British and French fellow men, and which, as we have been reminded, found a passionate and rarely permitted vent in the joyous manifestations with which the Prime Minister was acclaimed in Munich.

All these forces, added to the other deterrents which combinations of Powers, great and small, ready to stand firm upon the front of law and for the ordered remedy of grievances, would have formed, might well have been effective. Of course you cannot say for certain that they would.

[Interruption.] I try to argue fairly with the House. At the same time I do not think it is fair to charge those who wished to see this course followed, and followed consistently and resolutely, with having wished for an immediate war. Between submission and immediate war there was this third alternative, which gave a hope not only of peace but of justice. It is quite true that such a policy in order to succeed demanded that Britain should declare straight out and a long time beforehand that she would, with others, join to defend Czechoslovakia against an

unprovoked aggression. His Majesty's Government refused to give that guarantee when it would have saved the situation, yet in the end they gave it when it was too late, and now, for the future, they renew it when they have not the slightest power to make it good.

All is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakia recedes into the darkness. She has suffered in every respect by her association with the Western democracies and with the League of Nations, of which she has always been an obedient servant. She has suffered in particular from her association with France, under whose guidance and policy she has been actuated for so long. The very measures taken by His Majesty's Government in the Anglo-French Agreement to give her the best chance possible, namely, the 50 per cent. clean cut in certain districts instead of a plebiscite, have turned to her detriment, because there is to be a plebiscite too in wide areas, and those other Powers who had claims have also come down upon the helpless victim. Those municipal elections upon whose voting the basis is taken for the 50 per cent. cut were held on issues which had nothing to do with joining Germany. When I saw Herr Henlein over here he assured me that was not the desire of his people. Positive statements were made that it was only a question of home rule, of having a position of their own in the Czechoslovakian State. No one has a right to say that the plebiscite which is to be taken in areas under Saar conditions, and the clean-cut of the 50 per cent. areas—that those two operations together amount in the slightest degree to a verdict of self-determination. It is a fraud and a farce to invoke that name.

We in this country, as in other Liberal and democratic countries, have a perfect right to exalt the principle of self-determination, but it comes ill out of the mouths of those in totalitarian States who deny even the smallest element of toleration to every section and creed within their bounds. But, however you put it, this particular block of land, this mass of human beings to be handed over, has never expressed the desire to go into the Nazi rule. I do

not believe that even now—if their opinion could be asked, they would exercise such an option.

What is the remaining position of Czechoslovakia? Not only are they politically mutilated, but, economically and financially, they are in complete confusion. Their banking, their railway arrangements, are severed and broken, their industries are curtailed, and the movement of their population is most cruel. The Sudeten miners, who are all Czechs and whose families have lived in that area for centuries, must now flee into an area where there are hardly any mines left for them to work. It is a tragedy which has occurred. I did not like to hear the Minister of Transport yesterday talking about Humpty Dumpty. It was the Minister of Transport who was saying that it was a case of Humpty Dumpty that could never be put together again. There must always be the most profound regret and a sense of vexation in British hearts at the treatment and the misfortunes which have overcome the Czechoslovakian Republic. They have not ended here. At any moment there may be a hitch in the programme. At any moment there may be an order for Herr Goebbels to start again his propaganda of calumny and lies; at any moment an incident may be provoked, and now that the fortress line is given away what is there to stop the will of the conqueror? [Interruption.] It is too serious a subject to treat lightly. Obviously, we are not in a position to give them the slightest help at the present time, except what everyone is glad to know has been done, the financial aid which the Government have promptly produced.

I venture to think that in future the Czechoslovak State cannot be maintained as an independent entity. You will find that in a period of time which may be measured by years, but may be measured only by months, Czechoslovakia will be engulfed in the Nazi regime. Perhaps they may join it in despair or in revenge. At any rate, that story is over and told. But we cannot consider the abandonment and ruin of Czechoslovakia in the light only of what happened only last month. It is the most grievous consequence which we have yet experienced of

what we have done and of what we have left undone in the last five years—five years of futile good intention, five years of eager search for the line of least resistance, five years of uninterrupted retreat of British power, five years of neglect of our air defences. Those are the features which I stand here to declare and which marked an improvident stewardship for which Great Britain and France have dearly to pay. We have been reduced in those five years from a position of security so overwhelming and so unchallengeable that we never cared to think about it. We have been reduced from a position where the very word "war" was considered one which would be used only by persons qualifying for a lunatic asylum. We have been reduced from a position of safety and power—power to do good, power to be generous to a beaten foe, power to make terms with Germany, power to give her proper redress for her grievances, power to stop her arming if we chose, power to take any step in strength or mercy or justice which we thought right—reduced in five years from a position safe and unchallenged to where we stand now.

When I think of the fair hopes of a long peace which still lay before Europe at the beginning of 1933 when Herr Hitler first obtained power, and of all the opportunities of arresting the growth of the Nazi power which have been thrown away, when I think of the immense combinations and resources which have been neglected or squandered, I cannot believe that a parallel exists in the whole course of history. So far as this country is concerned the responsibility must rest with those who have the undisputed control of our political affairs. They neither prevented Germany from rearming, nor did they rearm ourselves in time. They quarrelled with Italy without saving Ethiopia. They exploited and discredited the vast institution of the League of Nations and they neglected to make alliances and combinations which might have repaired previous errors, and thus they left us in the hour of trial without adequate national defence or effective international security.

In my holiday I thought it was a chance to study

the reign of King Ethelred the Unready. The House will remember that that was a period of great misfortune, in which, from the strong position which we had gained under the descendants of King Alfred, we fell very swiftly into chaos. It was the period of Danegeld and of foreign pressure. I must say that the rugged words of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, written 1,000 years ago, seem to me apposite, at least as apposite as those quotations from Shakespeare with which we have been regaled by the last speaker from the Opposition Bench. Here is what the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle said, and I think the words apply very much to our treatment of Germany and our relations with her: "All these calamities fell upon us because of evil counsel, because tribute was not offered to them at the right time nor yet were they resisted; but when they had done the most evil, then was peace made with them." That is the wisdom of the past, for all wisdom is not new wisdom.

I have ventured to express those views in justifying myself for not being able to support the Motion which is moved to-night, but I recognise that this great matter of Czechoslovakia, and of British and French duty there, has passed into history. New developments may come along, but we are not here to decide whether any of those steps should be taken or not. They have been taken. They have been taken by those who had a right to take them because they bore the highest executive responsibility under the Crown. Whatever we may think of it, we must regard those steps as belonging to the category of affairs which are settled beyond recall. The past is no more, and one can only draw comfort if one feels that one has done one's best to advise rightly and wisely and in good time. I, therefore, turn to the future, and to our situation as it is to-day. Here, again, I am sure I shall have to say something which will not be at all welcome.

We are in the presence of a disaster of the first magnitude which has befallen Great Britain and France. Do not let us blind ourselves to that. It must now be accepted that all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will make the best terms they can

with the triumphant Nazi Power. The system of alliances in Central Europe upon which France has relied for her safety has been swept away, and I can see no means by which it can be reconstituted. The road down the Danube Valley to the Black Sea, the resources of corn and oil, the road which leads as far as Turkey, has been opened. In fact, if not in form, it seems to me that all those countries of Middle Europe, all those Danubian countries, will, one after another, be drawn into this vast system of power politics—not only power military politics but power economic politics—radiating from Berlin, and I believe this can be achieved quite smoothly and swiftly and will not necessarily entail the firing of a single shot. If you wish to survey the havoc of the foreign policy of Britain and France, look at what is happening and is recorded each day in the columns of the "Times." Why, I read this morning about Yugoslavia—and I know something about the details of that country— "The effects of the crisis for Yugoslavia can immediately be traced. Since the elections of 1935, which followed soon after the murder of King Alexander, the Serb and Croat Opposition to the Government of Dr. Stoyadinovitch have been conducting their entire campaign for the next elections under the slogan: 'Back to France, England, and the Little Entente; back to democracy.' The events of the past fortnight have so triumphantly vindicated Dr. Stoyadinovitch's policy" —his is a policy of close association with Germany— "that the Opposition has collapsed practically overnight; the new elections, the date of which was in doubt, are now likely to be held very soon and can result only in an overwhelming victory for Dr. Stoyadinovitch's Government." Here was a country which, three months ago, would have stood in the line with other countries to arrest what has occurred.

Again, what happened in Warsaw? The British and French Ambassadors visited Colonel Beck, or sought to visit him, the Foreign Minister, in order to ask for some mitigation in the harsh measures being pursued against Czechoslovakia about Teschen. The door was shut in their faces. The French Ambassador was not even granted an audience and

the British Ambassador was given a most curt reply by a political director. The whole matter is described in the Polish Press as a political indiscretion committed by those two Powers, and we are to-day reading of the success of Colonel Beck's blow. I am not forgetting, I must say, that it is less than 20 years ago since British and French bayonets rescued Poland from the bondage of a century and a half. I think it is indeed a sorry episode in the history of that country, for whose freedom and rights so many of us have had warm and long sympathy.

Those illustrations are typical. You will see, day after day, week after week, entire alienation of those regions. Many of those countries, in fear of the rise of the Nazi Power, have already got politicians, Ministers, Governments, who were pro-German, but there was always an enormous popular movement in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia which looked to the Western democracies and loathed the idea of having this arbitrary rule of the totalitarian system thrust upon them, and hoped that a stand would be made. All that has gone by the board. We are talking about countries which are a long way off and of which, as the Prime Minister might say, we know nothing. [Interruption.] The noble Lady says that that very harmless allusion is—

Viscountess Astor: Rude.

Mr. Churchill:

She must very recently have been receiving her finishing course in manners. What will be the position, I want to know, of France and England this year and the year afterwards? What will be the position of that Western front of which we are in full authority the guarantors? The German army at the present time is more numerous than that of France, though not nearly so matured or perfected. Next year it will grow much larger, and its maturity will be more complete. Relieved from all anxiety in the East, and having secured resources which will greatly diminish, if not entirely remove, the deterrent of a naval blockade, the rulers of Nazi Germany will have a free choice open to them in

what direction they will turn their eyes. If the Nazi dictator should choose to look westward, as he may, bitterly will France and England regret the loss of that fine army of ancient Bohemia which was estimated last week to require not fewer than 30 German divisions for its destruction.

Can we blind ourselves to the great change which has taken place in the military situation, and to the dangers we have to meet? We are in process, I believe, of adding, in four years, four battalions to the British Army. No fewer than two have already been completed. Here at least 30 divisions which must now be taken into consideration upon the French front, besides the 12 that were captured when Austria was engulfed. Many people, no doubt, honestly believe that they are only giving away the interests of Czechoslovakia, whereas I fear we shall find that we have deeply compromised, and perhaps fatally endangered, the safety and even the independence of Great Britain and France. This is not merely a question of giving up the German colonies, as I am sure we shall be asked to do. Nor is it a question only of losing influence in Europe. It goes far deeper than that. You have to consider the character of the Nazi movement and the rule which it implies. The Prime Minister desires to see cordial relations between this country and Germany. There is no difficulty at all in having cordial relations with the German people. Our hearts go out to them. But they have no power. You must have diplomatic and correct relations, but there can never be friendship between the British democracy and the Nazi Power, that Power which spurns Christian ethics, which cheers its onward course by a barbarous paganism, which vaunts the spirit of aggression and conquest, which derives strength and perverted pleasure from persecution, and uses, as we have seen, with pitiless brutality the threat of murderous force. That Power cannot ever be the trusted friend of the British democracy.

What I find unendurable is the sense of our country falling into the power, into the orbit and influence of Nazi Germany, and of our existence becoming dependent upon their good will or

pleasure. It is to prevent that that I have tried my best to urge the maintenance of every bulwark of defence—first the timely creation of an Air Force superior to anything within striking distance of our shores; secondly, the gathering together of the collective strength of many nations; and thirdly, the making of alliances and military conventions, all within the Covenant, in order to gather together forces at any rate to restrain the onward movement of this Power. It has all been in vain. Every position has been successively undermined and abandoned on specious and plausible excuses. We do not want to be led upon the high road to becoming a satellite of the German Nazi system of European domination. In a very few years, perhaps in a very few months, we shall be confronted with demands with which we shall no doubt be invited to comply. Those demands may affect the surrender of territory or the surrender of liberty. I foresee and foretell that the policy of submission will carry with it restrictions upon the freedom of speech and debate in Parliament, on public platforms, and discussions in the Press, for it will be said—indeed, I hear it said sometimes now—that we cannot allow the Nazi system of dictatorship to be criticised by ordinary, common English politicians. Then, with a Press under control, in part direct but more potently indirect, with every organ of public opinion doped and chloroformed into acquiescence, we shall be conducted along further stages of our journey.

It is a small matter to introduce into such a Debate as this, but during the week I heard something of the talk of Tadpole and Taper. They were very keen upon having a general election, a sort of, if I may say so, inverted khaki election. I wish the Prime Minister had heard the speech of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Abbey Division of Westminster (Sir S. Herbert) last night. I know that no one is more patient and regular in his attendance than the Prime Minister, and it is marvellous how he is able to sit through so much of our Debates, but it happened that by bad luck he was not here at that moment. I am sure, however, that if he had heard my hon. and gallant Friend's speech he would have felt very much annoyed that

such a rumour could even have been circulated. I cannot believe that the Prime Minister, or any Prime Minister possessed of a large working majority, would be capable of such an act of historic, constitutional indecency. I think too highly of him. Of course, if I have misjudged him on the right side, and there is a dissolution on the Munich Agreement, on Anglo-Nazi friendship, on the state of our defences and so forth, everyone will have to fight according to his convictions, and only a prophet could forecast the ultimate result; but, whatever the result, few things could be more fatal to our remaining chances of survival as a great Power than that this country should be torn in twain upon this deadly issue of foreign policy at a moment when, whoever the Ministers may be, united effort can alone make us safe.

I have been casting about to see how measures can be taken to protect us from this advance of the Nazi Power, and to secure those forms of life which are so dear to us. What is the sole method that is open? The sole method that is open is for us to regain our old island independence by acquiring that supremacy in the air which we were promised, that security in our air defences which we were assured we had, and thus to make ourselves an island once again. That, in all this grim outlook, shines out as the overwhelming fact. An effort at rearmament the like of which has not been seen ought to be made forthwith, and all the resources of this country and all its united strength should be bent to that task. I was very glad to see that Lord Baldwin yesterday in the House of Lords said that he would mobilise industry to-morrow. But I think it would have been much better if Lord Baldwin has said that 2½ years ago, when everyone demanded a Ministry of Supply. I will venture to say to hon. Gentlemen sitting here behind the Government Bench, hon. Friends of mine, whom I thank for the patience with which they have listened to what I have to say, that they have some responsibility for all this too, because, if they had given one tithe of the cheers they have lavished upon this transaction of Czechoslovakia to the small band of Members who were endeavouring to get timely rearmament set in

motion, we should not now be in the position in which we are. Hon. Gentlemen opposite, and hon. Members on the Liberal benches, are not entitled to throw these stones. I remember for two years having to face, not only the Government's deprecation, but their stern disapproval. Lord Baldwin has now given the signal, tardy though it may be; let us at least obey it.

After all, there are no secrets now about what happened in the air and in the mobilisation of our anti-aircraft defences. These matters have been, as my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Abbey Division said, seen by thousands of people. They can form their own opinions of the character of the statements which have been persistently made to us by Ministers on this subject. Who pretends now that there is air parity with Germany? Who pretends now that our anti-aircraft defences were adequately manned or armed? We know that the German General Staff are well informed upon these subjects, but the House of Commons has hitherto not taken seriously its duty of requiring to assure itself on these matters. The Home Secretary said the other night that he would welcome investigation. Many things have been done which reflect the greatest credit upon the administration. But the vital matters are what we want to know about. I have asked again and again during these three years for a secret Session where these matters could be thrashed out, or for an investigation by a Select Committee of the House, or for some other method. I ask now that, when we meet again in the autumn, that should be a matter on which the Government should take the House into its confidence, because we have a right to know where we stand and what measures are being taken to secure our position.

I do not grudge our loyal, brave people, who were ready to do their duty no matter what the cost, who never flinched under the strain of last week—I do not grudge them the natural, spontaneous outburst of joy and relief when they learned that the hard ordeal would no longer be required of them at the moment; but they should know the truth. They should know that there has been gross neglect and

deficiency in our defences; they should know that we have sustained a defeat without a war, the consequences of which will travel far with us along our road; they should know that we have passed an awful milestone in our history, when the whole equilibrium of Europe has been deranged, and that the terrible words have for the time being been pronounced against the Western democracies: "Thou art weighed in the balance and found wanting." And do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be proffered to us year by year unless by a supreme recovery of moral health and martial vigour, we arise again and take our stand for freedom as in the olden time.

5.59 p.m.

DELAYING WWII

Maps Lesson Plan

Name: _____

Date: _____

Instructor: _____

Time to complete: Materials/Technology/Resources:	60 Minutes * The <i>Delaying WWII</i> video (DVD format, or it can be streamed from izzit.org with no login required.) * Presentation Method (smartboard, projector, etc.) * Viewing Guide * Discussion Questions – one set for teacher only
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Standards:	Use our free and easy-to-use Standard Alignment tool to align this lesson with the standards in your school district.
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Learning Objective(s):	<i>Students will identify Czechoslovakia at various configurations during the 20th century on a map. They will also identify the regions of Czechoslovakia prior to the Munich Agreement, territorial claims made against Czechoslovakia in the 1930s, and the present configuration of the former Czechoslovakia.</i>
Topics: Czechoslovakia, Munich Agreement, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Subcarpathian Rus	


Absorb: (11:10 minutes)	<u>Watch:</u> <i>Delaying WWII</i> video in DVD format, or it can be streamed from izzit.org with no login required.
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
Overall guiding question(s):	How was Czechoslovakia originally formed? What is the significance of each change in borders from post-World War I through the end of the 20th century?
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<p>Lesson Procedures: (31 minutes)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Watch video: <i>Delaying WWII</i> 2. ACTIVITY: Hand out the maps and ask students to locate and identify the various divisions of Czechoslovakia. Particular emphases should be on the division lines that separate the sections and considerations used by the countries involved in the decision-making.
<p>Summary & Assessment: (15 minutes)</p>	<p>Assessment is based on accuracy and clarity of the map.</p> <p>Bring students back together to discuss their map features. Summary discussions may include the differences between the various divisions and any potential controversies surrounding the divisions the students may have found during their research.</p>
<p>Reflection: (5 minutes)</p>	<p>Select a current event, either from izzit.org or a news site. Discuss how the events in the Czech Republic and Slovakia are influencing neighboring countries.</p>


Maps

To the best of your ability, label one or more of the following maps with names of the regions and countries:





Czechoslovakian lands in April, 1939 after Germany, Hungary, and Poland seized land



Maps Answer Keys





Czechoslovakian lands in April, 1939 after Germany, Hungary, and Poland seized land



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